Innovation and new forms of economic governance

Krzysztof  Waśniewski

Published : 2016-09-14

Vol. 4 No. 3 (2016)

Innovation and new forms of economic governance

Krzysztof Waśniewski

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to study the connection between technological progress on the one hand, and systems of economic governance, on the other hand. A simple model of economic governance is introduced, deriving the functional ca-pacity of social structures to carry out technological progress from their capacity to appropriate capital. That capacity is grounded both in efficiency and legitima-tion. That broad theoretical frame is applied to the coexistence of constitutional states and other forms of economic governance. Empirical evidence indicates that constitutional states are losing their capacity to appropriate capital. Additional, con-textual evidence suggests two other patterns of social change. On the one hand, de-mographic growth is slowing down. On the other hand, absorption of innovation in the global economy, back in the past strongly correlated with the fiscal intervention of governments, presently seems to have disconnected from the economic power of constitutional states.

Keywords:

economic governance, innovations, social change

Details

References

Statistics

Authors

Download files

PDF

Citation rules

Waśniewski, K. . (2016). Innovation and new forms of economic governance. Forum Scientiae Oeconomia, 4(3), 56–65. Retrieved from https://ojs.wsb.edu.pl/index.php/fso/article/view/211

Altmetric indicators

Cited by / Share

References

Braudel, F. (1981), Civilization and capitalism, Vol. I: The structures of every-day life, London: William Collins, Sons & Co.

Braudel, F. (1983), Civilisation and capitalism, Part II: The wheels of com-merce, Book Club Associates, London: William Collins, Sons & Co.

Diamond, P.E. (1965), National debt in a neoclassical growth model, The Amer-ican Economic Review, 55(5): 1126-1150.

Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R., Timmer, M.P. (2015), The next generation of the penn world table, American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150-3182.

Francis, J.G., Francis, L.P. (2011), Rights variation within a federalist system: un-derstanding the importance of mobility, Political Research Quarterly, 64: 82-93.

Fraser, N. (1990), Rethinking the public sphere. A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy, Social Text, 25/26: 56-80.

Habermas, J. (1996), Between facts and norms. Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1979), Communication and the evolution of society, Boston: Bea-con Press.

Habermas, J. (1975), Legitimation crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1966), A general theory of rational behavior in game situations – Econometrica, 34(3): 613-634.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1953), Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk – taking, The Journal of Political Economy, 61(5): 434-435.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1967), Games with incomplete information played by “Bayes-ian” players. Part I: The basic model, Management Science, 14(3): 159-182.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1968), Games with incomplete information played by “Bayes-ian” players. Part II: Bayesian equilibrium points, Management Science, 14(5): 320 -334.

Hart, H.L.A. (1961), The concept of law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heath, S. (1957), Citadel, market, and altar. Emerging society. Outline of so-cionomy, The new natural science of society, Baltimore: The Science of Society Foundation.

Hodgson, G.M. (1993), Institutional economics: surveying the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, Metroeconomica, 44(1): 1-28.

Hodgson, G.M. (2006), Institutional economics, the individual actor and insti-tutional change, For the Alexander von Humboldt lecture at the University of Nijmegen, 5 December: 1-20.

Hodgson, G.M. (2000), The essence of institutional economics, Journal of Eco-nomic Issues, 2: 317-329.

Janeba, E. (2006), Moral federalism, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(1): 1-27.

King, L.A. (2005), The federal structure of a republic of reasons, Political The-ory, 33: 629 -653.

McCallum, H.S. (1970), The art of community, Institute for Humane Studies, Inc. Menlo Park.

Meade, J.E. (1958), Is the national debt a burden?, Oxford Economic Papers, 10(2): 126 -150.

Modigliani, F. (1961), Long-run implications of alternative fiscal policies and the burden of the national debt, Economic Journal, 71: 730-755.

Parsons, T., Shils E.A., Smelser, N.J. (Eds.) (1965), Toward a general theo-ry of action: Theoretical foundations for the social sciences, Transaction Publishers.

Rif kin, J. (2014), The zero marginal cost society: The internet of things, the collaborative commons, and the eclipse of capitalism, Macmillan.

Schlatter, R. (1951), Private property, the history of an idea, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1939), Business cycles. A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist process, New York-Toronto-London: McGraw-Hill.

Searle, J.R. (2005), What is an institution?, Journal of Institutional Economics, 1: 1-22.

Selten, R. (1975), Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, Journal International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1): 25-55.

Weingast, B. (1981), Regulation, reregulation, and deregulation: the political foundations of agency clientele relationships, Law and Contemporary Prob-lems, 44(1): 147-177.

Weingast, B. (1995), The economic role of political institutions, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11(1): 1-31.

Weingast, B.R., Shepsle, K.A., Johnsen, C. (1981), The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics, The Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 642-664.